Книга Потаённые страницы истории западной философии - Виктор Валентинович Костецкий

Pythagoras’ philosophy, without which a philosophy course cannot be complete.

Parmenides in the Shadow of Philosophy

From the review of opinions about the philosophy of Parmenides, it follows that philosophers avoid Parmenides, and historians of philosophy in their retellings lose the thread of presentation when trying to justify absurd theses. The article attempts to reconstruct the philosophy of Parmenides based on a different context of «being». The concepts of «being» and «non-being» in philosophy arise not as a result of abstraction and generalization, but as a result of the analysis of specific concepts. For Hegel, such a concrete concept is the concept of «beginning», logically decomposed into being and non-being, and then synthesized into «becoming»; in Parmenides, the context is given by the concept of «instant», which is also logically decomposed into being and non-being. The irrationality of the concept of «instant» (mathematically obvious) allowed Zeno to build a series of consistent aporias.

Plato’s logic as retold to artists

The article was written for the methodological collection of the St. Petersburg Academy of Arts with the aim not of introducing «Platonism», but with the aim of demonstrating logical analysis «according to Plato». In the article, such concepts as «drawing», «painting», «frame» are subjected to «platonic analysis». Throughout the article, the difference in «definitions» according to Socrates, according to Plato, according to Aristotle is shown. In all Plato’s dialogues the type of analysis is the same, «diaeresis». Socrates is credited with inventing the definition of the concept «through genus and specific difference». Aristotle’s approach to the definition of concepts goes far beyond the boundaries of formal logic, which in fact was created by him.

Word and sign in Aristotle’s philosophy

The article attempts to identify Aristotle’s original ideas regarding language and signs. Analysis shows that Aristotle does not classify words as signs. We can say that Aristotle understands «word» as the title of stories about a thing. It turns out that the word not only unites many stories under the guise of a common name, but also presupposes syllogisms from itself, from «logos». A word that has no other words (stories) inside it is not a word. Regarding to the sign, Aristotle’s position is also original: he excludes from the number of signs everything that can be excluded: images, words, signals, pointers, ciphers, signs. The concept of sign is defined by Aristotle either in relation to memory or in relation to inference. The connection between a word and a sign is that the word is marked with a «sign for memory» (name) and is capable of being a «sign for inference» (like the term of a syllogism). Aristotle takes the word beyond the limits of oral and written speech but brings it closer to figurativeness and visuality.

Aristotle’s treatise «Categories»: word and sign

Aristotle’s treatise «Categories» has a bad reputation in the history of philosophy: they either refuse to understand it or try to adapt it to one or another «ism». The article takes a different approach: there is a keyword in «Categories» that has been ignored for centuries. This is the word «said», which should not be taken literally as if someone said something. Categories refer to «what is said», but not by a person or even by a language. Things «speak» themselves; a person in his own language acts only as a translator from the «language of things» to the «language of people». Animals, accordingly, translate the «language of things» into their own «language of animals». In Aristotle’s philosophy, «metaphysics» comes from the understanding that a thing is always in a word, and a word is in a thing. This is not a confusion of words and things due to thoughtlessness, but a different understanding of «metaphysics», including questions of the philosophy of language.

Seneca’s transition from Plato to Aristotle: the problem of taste and conscience

In the history of philosophy, Seneca is known as a representative of the Stoics and «Academics», followers of Plato. But there is one case where Seneca not only differs in his opinion from the views of Plato, but sharply criticizes Plato. This is a question about the ratio between good and honor. «Good» in Plato’s hierarchy of ideas occupies the highest level: everything is from Good. Seneca, faced with the problem of Nero’s upbringing, concludes that without honor the idea of good ceases to be good. The concept of honor in the form of a «beautiful act» served as the basis in Aristotle’s ethics. As a result, Seneca, by relating the concepts of good (Plato) and honor (Aristotle), introduces a new concept into philosophy: «conscience». Conscience in Seneca’s concept as the unity of honor and good is unambiguous for all humanity but does not exist in every society. There is no conscience in a society when either there are no norms of behavior, or there are more than one. In this sense, conscience is a norm of behavior that is the same for all humanity – like the «beautiful act» from Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle is fully aware that the concept of «honor» is a class concept, but this does not exclude borrowing by other classes, even domestic servants. Honor arises only in one class but can be borrowed by all others. Seneca has the same «conscience». For Aristotle, «honor» and «beautiful deed» exist through each other, therefore, when moving to aesthetics, a connection arises between conscience and good taste. Good taste is as determined as conscience. Good taste goes back to the absoluteness of conscience, thereby acquiring an irrespective character.

Apology for Hegel’s dissertation «On the Orbits of the Planets»

Hegel’s dissertation «On the Orbits of the Planets» is usually regarded either as an unsuccessful attempt by a speculative philosopher to have his say in astronomy, or as insignificant preparatory materials for a future «philosophy of nature». However, Hegel’s dissertation is not at all about astronomy and not exactly about the philosophy of nature; it is about a possible «big physics» in the future, based on principles other than traditional European science. Under the